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Abstract—Malicious software (malware) with decentralized
communication infrastructure, such as peer-to-peer botnets, is
difﬁcult to detect. In this paper, we describe a trafﬁc-sanitization
method for identifying malware-triggered outbound connections
from a personal computer. Our solution correlates user activities
with the content of outbound trafﬁc. Our key observation is
that user-initiated outbound trafﬁc typically has corresponding
human inputs, i.e., keystroke or mouse clicks. Our analysis on the
causal relations between user inputs and packet payload enables
the efﬁcient enforcement of the inter-packet dependency at the
application level.
We formalize our approach within the framework of protocol-
state machine. We deﬁne new application-level trafﬁc-sanitization
policies that enforce the inter-packet dependencies. The depen-
dency is derived from the transitions among protocol states that
involve both user actions and network events. We refer to our
methodology as storytelling security.
We demonstrate a concrete realization of our methodology in
the context of peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing application, describe its
use in blocking trafﬁc of P2P bots on a host. We implement
and evaluate our prototype in Windows operating system in
both online and ofﬂine deployment settings. Our experimental
evaluation along with case studies of real-world P2P applica-
tions demonstrates the feasibility of verifying the inter-packet
dependencies. Our deep packet inspection incurs overhead on
the outbound network ﬂow. Our solution can also be used as an
ofﬂine collect-and-analyze forensic tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal computers have been and continue to be targets
of many clandestine cyber crimes. Modern attackers aim to
remotely control infected machines and conceal their tracks.
Because they are able to infect a large number of distributed
computers (e.g., the recently taken-down Mariposa botnet has
estimated 12 million victims [12]), the malicious activities
such as denial-of-service attacks launched from individual
hosts may not be obvious to the conventional statistics based
detection. Botnet victims are usually distributed across the
globe, e.g., Mariposa botnet reached into 190 countries [12]).
For botnets with a centralized command-and-control (C&C)
architecture, Internet-wide (as opposed to local area network)
detection of suspicious network-trafﬁc patterns can be effective
in identifying an unusually large trafﬁc volume to speciﬁc
domains or IP addresses.
In comparison, botnets (and malware in general) based on
peer-to-peer (P2P) communication architecture is much harder
to detect than those run with centralized servers. For example,
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Peacomm uses P2P network to search for new commands
and executables. Each Peacomm bot’s binary comes with a
hardcoded list of peers. The malware is delivered as a trojan,
as it is disguised as video attachment to email. Once it gets
executed on the victim machine, it publishes itself to the
network by contacting its peers. The bot searches for some
keys that are hardcoded. The search returns a value that is
decoded into a URL, which hosts the new executables that bots
can download. This search-and-download process is repeated,
each time with a new search key. Keys are generated based
on the current date and a random number from 0 to 31 [7].
A Peacomm peer is identiﬁed with a hash value as well as IP
address and port number. The size of peer list varies but is
usually around one hundred. Upon execution, the bot actively
sends heartbeat messages at high port numbers. Other P2P
botnets include Storm and Nugache [5], [20].
Naive statistical approaches of Internet-wide detection can
be easily circumvented by attackers through the use of tech-
niques such as fast IP ﬂux [9] or domain ﬂux, where IPs
or domain names of command servers change frequently.
The scale and the distributed and dynamic nature of data
also increase the difﬁculty of accurate detection. Recently,
researchers proposed a method for localizing botnet members
based on speciﬁc communication characteristics underlying
types of P2P botnets [17]. Despite the progress of network-
based detection techniques, there is an urgent need for pro-
viding host-based security mechanisms that can provide a
robust line of defense. The host-based protection requires
sophisticated techniques beyond the existing signature-based
solutions found in most commercial security products for PCs.
In this paper, we describe a host-based network security
approach for monitoring outbound P2P trafﬁc and detecting
suspicious malware activities originated from the host. Specif-
ically, our solution is capable of examining the payload of
outbound packets and perform content-based correlation with
user inputs (namely keyboard and mouse inputs), in order to
identify the network activities not initiated by the user.
Our ultimate goal is to devise an intelligent agent that
is capable of performing complex inference to distinguish
suspicious trafﬁc from legitimate ones. Such an agent com-
prehensively observes activities of a host across the operating
system and applications and makes real-time decisions. Our
key observation is that user-initiated outbound trafﬁc typically
has corresponding human inputs. Our goal is to block trafﬁc
that is not associated with legitimate user inputs, which is
referred to by us as user-intention based trafﬁc sanitization.
For P2P trafﬁc, however, one of the main technical challenges
for correlating user inputs with outbound network connections2
is that some connections are automatically generated by P2P
clients. These trafﬁc should be properly examined without
creating false alerts.
We identify the inter-packet dependency in the application-
layer trafﬁc. Inter-packet dependency is deﬁned by us as
the causal relations among a sequence of packets observed,
and how their payloads are related to their order of arrival.
For example, in typical P2P applications search keywords
(speciﬁcally their hash values) appear in the payload of
outbound search requests; subsequently, ﬁle hashes returned
from the peers in response to the user’s query appear in the
subsequent outgoing request at downloading. The correct inter-
packet dependency can be obtained according to the protocol
speciﬁcations of the (legitimate) application speciﬁcations. In
this paper, we do not consider unknown protocols. Trafﬁc
of unknown protocol type can be used to infer protocol
speciﬁcation, as recently demonstrated by Wang et al [29].
We hypothesize that the inter-packet dependency can be
identiﬁed and enforced at the application-layer trafﬁc for
security purposes. Trafﬁc that does not follow the pre-deﬁned
inter-packet dependency can be identiﬁed and ﬂagged. We
perform a case study on eMule trafﬁc demonstrating the
feasibility of our hypothesis. We formally describe our models
and present our prototype implementation and experimental
evaluation.
Intuitively, this causal relation in network ﬂows of a host
build a logical story around the observed network events and
user actions. Thus, we refer to our approach as storytelling
security. The storytelling approach is powerful, and is useful
beyond the speciﬁc P2P trafﬁc studied. For example, similar
analysis can be applied to ﬁle-system behaviors such as ﬁle-
system access, as well as other application-level trafﬁc such as
HTTP ﬂows of browser. In general, our approach is a speciﬁc
form of the anomaly detection, which is ﬁeld pioneered by
Denning [4]. What distinguishes our work from existing ones
is that i) we uniquely integrate user behaviors in our inference,
and ii) we focus on application semantics that provides a rich
and concrete context for the analysis.
In order to realize user-intention based trafﬁc sanitization,
we also need to interpret the semantic meanings of user inputs,
speciﬁcally to understand the implication associated with user
actions. For example, it is straightforward to observe a mouse
click by the user and learn its timestamp, coordinates, and the
process to which it is fed at the kernel level. In comparison,
application-speciﬁc information associated with a user action
provides more concrete and useful. In this paper, we formally
deﬁne the semantic gap of user intention and describe the
associated technical challenges.
Our Contributions Our technical contributions are sum-
marized as follows.
• We describe a new security methodology – referred to
as the storytelling security – for inspecting outbound
network trafﬁc of applications. The analysis can be used
as a forensic tool for diagnosing personal computers for
abnormalities caused by malicious software or corrupted
applications. We formalize our storytelling-security ap-
proach in the context of protocol-state machine (PSM).
The uniqueness of our model is that we integrate dynamic
user actions in constructing protocol-state machine and
enforcing trafﬁc-sanitization policies.
• We give a concrete realization of our storytelling-security
approach in the context of P2P application. We describe
the architecture and implementation of a host-based tool
for monitoring and analyzing user-input events and trafﬁc
associated with a P2P ﬁle-sharing application in Windows
operating system.
• We evaluate the performance of our tool in two deploy-
ment scenarios: real-time and off-line trafﬁc sanitization.
Our experiments show that both types of deployment are
feasible. The overhead in the real-time analysis decreases
the throughput of outbound trafﬁc, indicating the tradeoff
between security and usability. Our ofﬂine analysis incurs
very low computational overhead. Our evaluation results
suggest that our solution is better used as a diagnostic
and forensic tool that either runs as needed in a diagnos-
tic session or runs in the ofﬂine collection-and-analyze
mode.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The deﬁni-
tions and models used in our work are given in Section II.
Section III presents an overview of our solution and describes
details of our approach. We present our prototype implemen-
tation in section IV and describe the experimental evaluation
in section V. Finally, we discussed related work in section VI
and conclude the paper in section VII.
II. DEFINITIONS AND MODELS
In this section, we describe an abstract resource manage-
ment model to represent typical operations of a peer-to-peer
(P2P) client. This simpliﬁed model allows us to better present
and explain our trafﬁc sanitization solution in Section III.
Then, we give our security model, including our attack model
and security assumptions.
A. An Abstract Model for a P2P Client
For a typical ﬁle-sharing P2P client on a host, its operations
include setup, publish, search and download, and mainte-
nance.
• Setup All resources including peers and resources (i.e.,
data objects) in a peer-to-peer network are identiﬁable
by a unique hash value. The hash value associated with
a peer – PeerID is computed and assigned to it when it
joins the peer-to-peer network. For practical purposes, the
PeerID can be generated by P2P ﬁle-sharing software.
• Publish A data owner generates hash values – ObjectID
– for data objects to be shared. The process of publish-
ing is to announce to neighboring nodes the ownership
of certain objects. An ObjectID is computed based on
corresponding ﬁle’s meta information.
• Search and download ObjectIDs are used for search-
ing objects in peer-to-peer networks. Each P2P node
maintains a distributed hashtable (DHT) that is used
for searching and routing purposes. The table contains
the ObjectIDs of neighboring nodes that are close ac-
cording to certain virtual distance measure in the P2P
overlay network. We refer readers for P2P literature such3
as Tapestry [31], Chord [26], and Kad [13] for more
distance-computation information.
• Maintenance A P2P client periodically sends to its neigh-
bors in DHT heartbeat messages to inform its availability,
which is used to keep an updated distributed hashtable.
For trafﬁc sanitization, we focus on analyzing operations
that involve network activities, such as search and download.
We consider two common types of explicit user actions on a
P2P client that may trigger network activities as follows.
• Searching for a data object: User enters one or more
keywords to a textbox via the external keyboard device.
Upon receiving the keywords, the P2P client computes
the hash values {h1,...,hn} for each of the n keywords.
It queries its neighbors (in the DHT) for the requested
ObjectIDs. Speciﬁcally, the P2P client sends outbound
packets with the ObjectIDs {h1,...,hn} included in the
payload. The P2P client receives from the neighboring
nodes a list of ﬁle information (ﬁle names and their
corresponding ObjectIDs) as well as the information of
owners (IP addresses and PeerIDs). A schematic drawing
of the search process is in Figure 1.
• Downloading a ﬁle: The user selects one or more ﬁles
to download via explicit mouse clicks. The P2P client
sends outbound requests to corresponding peers and re-
trieves ﬁles from one or more peers (for example, in the
BitTorrent protocol pieces of a ﬁle may be retrieved from
multiple peers).
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Fig. 1. A schematic drawing of how user inputs are transformed into
outbound search requests in a P2P ﬁle-sharing client.
A P2P client may perform network operations without
explicit user actions or permissions, such as sending heartbeat
messages for maintaining DHT or uploading ﬁles in the user’s
shared folder to other peers upon requests. These automatic
operations make our trafﬁc sanitization challenging, because
there is no causal relation between user actions and these
network events. Whitelists can be used to ﬁlter some of the
trafﬁc, which we describe in Section III.
B. Attack Model and Security Assumptions
We consider stealthy malware that is aware of P2P ﬁle
sharing applications installed in the host and secretly sending
outbound P2P trafﬁc with the same format. The malware
can corrupt the P2P application. Thus, the P2P ﬁle sharing
application is not assumed to be trusted. Malware may run
as a user-level application – Type-0 malware according to the
stealthy malware taxonomy [21]. Malware is active in making
outside connections for command & control, attacks, or exﬁl-
trating. Exﬁltration refers to exporting stolen information such
as sensitive personal data or proprietary corporate information
as in Hydraq malware.
We assume that the kernel as well as the components in our
sanitization framework along with its ﬁles are not corrupted
by the malware. This trust assumption on secure kernel can
be relaxed by utilizing trusted computing infrastructure such
as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [28], [27]. TPM is avail-
able on most commodity PCs through a standard attestation
procedure [22]. TPM provides the guarantee of load-time
code integrity. System integrity can also be achieved through
the use of virtual machine monitor (VMM). At the VMM-
level, it is technically complex to interpret the semantics of
application-speciﬁc guest OS data and inputs as demonstrated
in [11]. Our analysis would not be efﬁcient in VMM-based
systems, due to the technical difﬁculties in accessing and
reconstructing dynamic application-level data. TPM does not
provide detection ability for run-time compromises such as
buffer overﬂow attacks [6]. This issue is still an open research
problem in the security community with some recent promis-
ing development [14], [15], [16].
In this work, we assume the packets belonging to a speciﬁc
(P2P) application can be identiﬁed on a host. This assumption
can be realized by several means, for example, to associate net-
work ﬂows with their corresponding process information (such
as PID and process name) using constant netstat queries.
Because the P2P application is not trusted, our deep packet
inspection is necessary for ﬁltering out malware-triggered
trafﬁc disguised as legitimate P2P trafﬁc. This method can
be generalized to host-wide monitoring. This topic is subject
of our future work. Our analysis works only for unencrypted
trafﬁc.
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne protocol-state machine, and
describe how they are used to realize storytelling security.
Then, we brieﬂy explain the technical challenges associated
with inferring user intention. Finally, we present our architec-
ture for user-intention based P2P trafﬁc sanitization.
A. A Protocol-State Machine for P2P Application
To detect malware’s network activities, we enforce the
properties and data dependencies of the protocol states of an
application. Our techniques inspect the network trafﬁc and
system events of a host. We aim to identify the causal relations
between user intention and network events. We assume that
all the trafﬁc belonging to a speciﬁc application have been
identiﬁed, as explained in Section II-B. We deﬁne protocol-
state machine (PSM) in Deﬁnition 3.1 following Wang et
al [29].
Deﬁnition 3.1: The protocol state machine is a ﬁnite state
automaton illustrating all possible states in the protocol and
conditions for the transitions among states.4
Given the speciﬁcation of a protocol, protocol-state machine
can be obtained. PSM is useful for network security, in
particular anomaly detection. For example, malformed packets
(e.g., TCP packet with both SYN and FIN bits set) can be
identiﬁed and rejected. Recent work [29] also demonstrated
the feasibility of using statistical methods to infer probabilistic
protocol-state machine from unencrypted trafﬁc, when speci-
ﬁcations are unknown.
Our analysis on PSM has a unique ﬂavor, as we focus
on the states and their transitions that have two properties:
i) generating outbound network trafﬁc and ii) transitions
triggered by user inputs. Figure 2 illustrates the PSM of a
typical P2P application. Some state transitions are implicit and
happen without any external inputs, e.g., from init state
to waiting for user inputs. For the simplicity of
description, we do not consider ﬁle uploading, which can be
easily included to our work. Our PSM model described in this
paper is a simpliﬁed abstraction of real-world applications. En-
forcing the protocol state machine may be complex in general,
especially for modern applications that support asynchronous
user-interaction architecture such as AJAX.
B. Trafﬁc Types and Analysis Complexity
Based on the protocol-state machine in Figure 2, we dis-
tinguish four types of outgoing packets in P2P applications:
Type I: heartbeat, Type II: keyword-search request, Type III:
peer-connection request, and Type IV: ﬁle-download request.
Different sanitization policies are applied to different types of
trafﬁc. In this work, we focus on inspecting Types II, III, IV
trafﬁc, because they are directly or indirectly triggered by user
actions. Types I trafﬁc does not involve explicit user actions,
which is discussed in Section III-C.
Sophisticated sanitization policies can be generated based
on evaluating the current protocol state with respect to the
previous states. Each state is associated with some informa-
tion, e.g., user inputs, incoming or outgoing trafﬁc. Inter-state
comparison and analysis based on the state information incurs
overhead.
Consider a path on a protocol-state machine of length k. A
path represents a traversal of certain protocol states following
allowed transitions. The length of the path is the number of
states in the traversal. Denote ni as the size of data items
associated with the i-th state on the path (i ∈ [1,k]). Policies
that involve linear-correlation based analysis on this path
of length k incur computation complexity O(Πk
i=1ni) (i.e.,
O(n1n2 ...nk). We deﬁne linear correlation as the analysis
that involves comparing each data item in its linear form
– only linear transformation of data items is used, e.g.,
y = ax+b. Our architecture provides the support for general
trafﬁc-sanitization policies. We demonstrate a simple policy
that compares two sets of hash values (representing PeerIDs
and ObjectIDs): one set is generated from user inputs and
incoming trafﬁc, and the other set appears in outgoing packets.
Further details can be found in Section V-B.
C. Technical Challenges of Storytelling Security
One technical challenge in our approach is how to capture
user intention on a computer. In our work, we collect the
input events from keyboard and mouse devices to represent
user intention. To predict legitimate P2P trafﬁc based on
observed user inputs, a straightforward solution is to compare
the timestamps of input events and outbound packets. In that
case, outbound packets are allowed only when they happen
shortly after some user inputs. However, this simple approach
is coarse grained, and easy for malware to circumvent. We
perform payload inspection with policies, which is more ﬁne-
grained than temporal-based comparison such as in [3].
User-input events collected at the kernel level are usually
transformed by the destination applications. As a result, events
such as mouse clicks have speciﬁc meanings or semantics in
their destination application. For example, in a browser a user
clicks on a hyperlink; the semantics of the mouse-click event
includes the content of the hyperlink. Computation on user
inputs is another type of semantic transformation. For example,
in P2P ﬁle-sharing application, a search keyword (e.g., Harry
Potter) is entered by a user, the hashes of which (e.g., H(Harry)
and H(Potter)), is used to form a P2P search request for the
corresponding ﬁles. We deﬁne the semantic gap of inputs in
Deﬁnition 3.2.
Deﬁnition 3.2: The semantic gap of inputs refers to the
differences in the meanings of user-input events at the kernel
level and the application level. It captures the lack of semantic
information of user-input events collected within the kernel.
Our analysis is independent of the P2P application, thus
it is robust against compromised P2P applications. Yet, the
problem of semantic gap exists for mouse clicks. To tackle
the problem in our speciﬁc P2P ﬁle-sharing context, we use
the protocol-state machine to carefully propagate the trust
from the data of init state to the data of subsequent
states. The trust chain is extended – a piece of information
is trusted if and only if it is either entered by the user or
directly or indirectly caused by the user actions. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that the initial keyboard inputs to the application
are search keywords and trusted; to eliminate the need for
interpreting semantic meanings of mouse-click events during
the ﬁle-selection-and-download phase, we extract legitimate
PeerIDs and ObjectIDs from the legitimate incoming trafﬁc.
More details are explained in the next section.
To realize P2P trafﬁc sanitization, we collect two types
of data ﬂows: user activities and outbound trafﬁc, and then
perform a content-based analysis according to pre-deﬁned
policies. Figure 3 shows the architecture of our system,
which has two main components correlation engine and trafﬁc
monitor as described next. We explain our correlation engine
in the next section. The trafﬁc monitor is described in the
following section.
D. Correlation Engine and Trafﬁc-Sanitization Policies
The correlation engine performs the input-trafﬁc correlation
on two data streams – user-input data and network packets.
We monitor both incoming and outbound packets of a speciﬁc
application at the transport layer on a host. We focus on
inspecting trafﬁc of Types II, III, and IV. Type I (heartbeat)
messages are sent automatically without direct or indirect user
actions, and thus are not considered. They can be ﬁltered5
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their interactions with the host’s network stack.
based on a whitelist, for example, a host can only send Type-I
heartbeat messages to the remote peers speciﬁed by a white
list. The whitelist prevents a host from initiating connection
to any arbitrary remote peer. Yet, the host can request objects
from previous unknown peers if and only if that peer’s ID
appears in the incoming-hash list, which indicates that the peer
(namely its PeerID) has the requested object. The incoming-
hash list is populated as a result of previous object search
requests. Thus, the dependency and the causal relation between
the peer ID and previous search response/request are veriﬁed.
We formalize our policy in Step 3 below.
A schematic drawing of the detailed workﬂow regarding
our trafﬁc sanitization is shown in Figure 4. The detailed
operations including the speciﬁc trafﬁc-sanitization policies
that we use are explained below.
1) Step 1a of Figure 4. Our user-input monitor runs at the
kernel level and intercepts all user’s keyboard events.
It records the content, timestamp, and application in-
formation, e.g., {eMule.exe,4327,20:12:34,’w’} where
4327 is the process ID and 20:12:34 is the timestamp
of the event. Keys entered at the kernel level may need
pre-processing. For example, a user may backspace to
delete typos; our input monitor records every key press
including backspace. Thus, we need to sanitize and
reconstruct user inputs before they are analyzed.
In Step 2a, the input monitor passes user inputs for
application-speciﬁc transformation, namely to generate
corresponding hash values. The hash values are stored in
a data structure that supports fast search, e.g., hashmap.
The data structure referred to by us as input-hash list is
accessed by the Analyzer described later.
2) Step 1b and 2b. A Trafﬁc collector intercepts all the
outbound trafﬁc (i.e., requests) as well as incoming
packets, speciﬁcally all incoming and outgoing Type II
and Type III trafﬁc as deﬁned in Section III-B. It extracts
the payload from packets for further inspection. We
maintain two lists of hash values: outgoing-hash list and
incoming-hash list. Outgoing-hash list is a data structure
consisting of the hash values appearing in outbound
packets of the P2P ﬁle-sharing application.
The incoming-hash list contains the trusted hash values
that are allowed to appear in the outbound trafﬁc. The
content of outbound packets depends on the preceding
inbound trafﬁc, which is captured in the list.
The incoming-hash list is a data structure consisting of6
the hash values appearing in the payload of incoming
packets. The incoming-hash list contains either i) the
ObjectIDs of requested ﬁles, and ii) the PeerIDs of
those who have the requested objects. In our work,
the enforcement of inter-packet dependency is embodied
and realized by the comparison of the lists of hash
values (See Step 3 below). Timestamp and process
information corresponding to each hash value are ob-
tained and stored. We performed a case study on eMule
trafﬁc, a popular P2P ﬁle-sharing application, to conﬁrm
our hypothesis that the inter-packet dependency in the
application trafﬁc can be identiﬁed and enforced with
proper sanitization. The details of the case study is not
shown due to page limit.
Extracting data from packets makes use of the knowl-
edge of the packet format with no hidden data ﬁelds 1.
We ensure that packets are well formed according to the
protocol speciﬁcation, and obtain the ﬁelds correspond-
ing to the hash-values in both requests and responses
messages. These hash values are then carefully com-
pared according to sanitization policies in Step 3 next.
3) Step 3. Analyzer takes the processed input data in input-
hash list and packet payload in outgoing-hash list and
incoming-hash list, and applies pre-deﬁned sanitization
policies that compare the two types of data ﬂows.
The policies are generated based on the protocol-state
machine of the application.
In general, there is a tradeoff between the security and
efﬁciency – more complex rules impose higher compu-
tation and data-storage overhead. Our trafﬁc-sanitization
policy speciﬁes that i) the comparison is between hash
values h,h0 associated with the same process ID, i.e.,
PIDh = PIDh0; ii) each hash value (PeerID or Ob-
jectID) in the outgoing-hash list Hout should previously
appear in the input-hash list Huser or the incoming-
hash list Hin; and iii) the timestamps Th and Th0 of
two comparable hash values h,h0 should differ within a
threshold τ, which is formalized as follows.
∀h ∈ Hout,∃h0 ∈ Hin or Huser,such that
h = h0,Th − Th0 ≤ τ,PIDh = PIDh0.
For those hash values that fail the above veriﬁca-
tion, their corresponding outgoing packet information is
logged and reported.
Our design shows how static protocol-speciﬁcation infor-
mation can be used to dynamically enforce system properties
of a host. Our architecture is general and can be used to
support complex policies on application-level trafﬁc. Our
model provides a concrete embodiment of the storytelling-
security approach in the context of P2P application – our
security analysis tells a story about the user’s interaction with
the application. Our prototype implementation and evaluation
are presented in the next two sections.
1Hidden data ﬁelds in payload may be used for covert channels. The general
discussion of covert channels is omitted due to page limit.
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E. Trafﬁc Monitor With CompareView
Our scheme requires outgoing network packets to ﬂow
through two veriﬁcation checkpoints. One checkpoint at the
transport layer of the network stack of a host is for causal
relation veriﬁcation (as described in Section III-D above). The
other is for trafﬁc-integrity veriﬁcation, which is explained
here. A schematic drawing is shown in Figure 3.
We inspect every outgoing packet of a P2P application.
Thus, we need to guarantee that no malicious bot packet by-
passes our cause-relationship veriﬁcation. However, malware
may attempt to hide its trafﬁc by circumventing or bypassing
our transportation-layer checkpoint. Malware may disable the
checkpoint all together. For the trafﬁc-integrity veriﬁcation,
we examine every single outgoing network segment for its
provenance proof. The goal is that no packet can circumvent
our trafﬁc integrity veriﬁcation.
To prevent these attacks and ensure the completeness of
collected trafﬁc, we utilize an existing host-based trafﬁc-
monitoring approach called CompareView [25]. It forces all
outbound trafﬁc to pass through a transport-layer entry point,
and identiﬁes those that do not – referred to as provenance
veriﬁcation by [25]. The entry point can be used to deploy so-
phisticated personal ﬁrewalls that enforce application-speciﬁc
policies. This entry point is where we deploy our sanitization
policies for real-time trafﬁc inspection.
Speciﬁcally, there are two kernel modules in CompareView,
Sign and Verify modules. They extend the host’s existing
network stack. This trafﬁc-monitor architecture is shown in
Figure 3. The two kernel modules share a secret cryptographic
key. The key is used to ensure the integrity of outbound
network packets. All legitimate outgoing packets ﬁrst pass
through the Sign module, and then through the Verify module.
The Sign module signs every outbound packet, and sends a
short provenance proof to the Verify module on the same host,
which later veriﬁes the proof with a shared key. The proof
indicates the provenance or origin of an outbound packet, i.e.,
the packet passed through the transport-layer entry point [25].
If a packet’s proof is missing or cannot be veriﬁed, then it is7
labeled as suspicious. This packet bypasses the Sign modules,
and likely is generated by stealthy malware. The proof can be
realized with keyed-hash such as HMAC.
Real-time analysis is more difﬁcult to realize that off-line
analysis, as data from multiple sources needs to be pulled
together. For efﬁciency and scalability considerations, our
approach is more suitable for intrusion detection systems (IDS)
as opposed to intrusion prevention systems (IPS). In IPS, the
analysis results have to be applied to block malicious trafﬁc
at real time.
IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation in
Windows operating system, including the detailed realization
of trafﬁc sanitization and input-trafﬁc correlation. We also
present a simple P2P client and the speciﬁc ﬁltering rules that
we use for evaluation.
A. Implementation Details
We implement a prototype of the P2P trafﬁc sanitiza-
tion framework by expanding the TCP/IP network stack in
Windows XP. We describe our implementations of the main
components input monitor, trafﬁc monitor, and analyzer in our
prototypes next.
Input monitor uses Inputhook.dll to record all the user inputs
with timestamps and application information (e.g., process ID
and name). All the collected data is stored in kernel ﬁle and
protected by kernel. Monitoring keyboard inputs is realized
using existing windows hook mechanism, such as input hook.
Deliminators are used to process each record and to produce
a list of words input from the user. Our prototype does not
require the logging of mouse events.
The collected user inputs are stored character-by-character.
We reproduce meaningful words from these raw inputs. This
transformation is done by grouping the characters based on
certain deliminators such as 0x20 (space), 0x0d (enter), and
0x08 (backspace). This process yields the search keywords
that user enters. The input monitor computes hash values on
the collected search keywords. This input-hash list is stored in
the memory, which can be accessed by the analyzer (described
below). The list represents the trusted values that we use to
infer legitimate trafﬁc.
Trafﬁc monitor and analyzer intercept and ﬁlter outbound
trafﬁc sending from the application layer. It can capture all
outbound trafﬁc and detect stealthy trafﬁc that bypass our
sanitization. We realize it by hooking on the Windows TDI
(Transport Device Interface) driver’s tdi send(), tdi receive()
function. TDI is the interface in Windows OS that imposes
the transport-layer access to applications. We use a TDI
hook for the trafﬁc-monitoring purpose. Our trafﬁc monitor
uses a special packet identiﬁer (namely string kwhv) as a
ﬁlter to capture trafﬁc sent by our simulator (described in
Section IV-B). It extracts the payload (namely hash values)
from the outgoing packet. The hash value is passed down to the
causal-relation analyzer for further investigation. Timestamp
is recorded for each outgoing packet. Similarly, the incoming-
hash list can be maintained.
Our prototype expands the TDI hook to realize an analyzer
that enforces a simple trafﬁc-sanitization policy – whether or
not the outbound packet contains a hash value in the input-
hash list and the incoming-hash list. In our implementation,
we use the debug view to display the veriﬁcation results.
Our prototype is implemented as an online tool for real-time
detection. We also implement an ofﬂine collection-and-analyze
version, which can be used as a forensic tool to diagnose
computers in both personal or enterprise environments when
needed.
Our prototype is implemented on top of TDIFW, which is
a lightweight personal ﬁrewall for Windows operating system.
A screenshot of the output of our tool is shown in Figure 5.
B. A Simple P2P-Client Simulator
To test the functionality of our trafﬁc-sanitization prototype
at real time, we implemented a simple peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
simulator in C++. This program simulates basic functions
of peer-to-peer ﬁle-sharing software, including i) generating
hashes based on user inputs, ii) sending keyword-search re-
quests, iii) receiving search responses, and iv) generating ﬁle-
search requests. Our trafﬁc-sanitization prototype is used to
inspect the outbound trafﬁc in Steps ii) and iv).
i) Hash-value generation. We use MD5 that outputs 128-bit
hash value for a keyword entered or for a peer. MD5 is used in
many P2P ﬁle-sharing applications including eMule. When a
user launches a keyword search in our simulator, the simulator
calls the hash function to generate corresponding hash value
of each keyword.
ii) Submitting keyword-search requests. The simulator pre-
pares and sends outgoing search requests based on the hash
values in UDP packets. The packets are sent to a remote sink.
To identify the outgoing packets sent by our simulator, we put
a unique string kwhv at the beginning of our packet headers
as shown in Figure 5. A more general approach is to use the
native Windows API (e.g., IPHelper) that allows one to obtain
the process ID and name information associated with a packet
based on destination IP and port number.
iii) Receiving search responses. To be able to simulate the
incoming trafﬁc, we store the ﬁle-location information in each
peer’s ﬁle in a special folder on the localhost, including status,
keyword hash, ﬁle name, ﬁle hash, and ﬁle size. The status
ﬁeld means the peer is active or not. Keyword hash is the
hash value computed from the search keywords. File name, ﬁle
hash, and ﬁle size are the name, hash value, and size of the ﬁle,
respectively. Our client searches the hash values in this pre-
deﬁned folder for possible matches. Each result corresponds
to a ﬁle whose hash value matches the keyword. The results
are displayed to the user.
iv) Generating ﬁle-search requests. A user selects a ﬁle in
the list of the search results. The client prepares an outgoing
UDP packet with the hash value corresponding to the requested
ﬁle. The packets are sent to a remote sink.
At the real-time detection, our trafﬁc-sanitization tool ana-
lyzes the network ﬂow generated by the simulator as follows.
Our tool populates the input-hash list with the keywords
entered via the keyboard in Step i). Similarly, it populates8
the incoming-hash list with the hash values of keyword-search
results returned in Step iii). The outgoing-hash list is populated
by parsing and extracting the hash values in Steps ii) and
iv). The trafﬁc-sanitization policy of the simulator is that the
payload (namely hash value) in an outgoing packet should
appear either in the input-hash list or the incoming-hash list.
In addition, a delay threshold can be speciﬁed to constrain the
interval between the timestamps of the two events and hash
values being compared. The purpose is to prevent stale hash
values from being replayed.
C. Synthesized malware trafﬁc
We write a proof-of-concept malware that is capable of in-
jecting well-formed UDP packets to outbound trafﬁc. The mal-
ware payload contains arbitrary data. Our trafﬁc-sanitization
tool is able to detect the malware activities, because they do
not correlate to the required hash values.
A legitimate application may be compromised by malware,
where the malware calls the application’s APIs to send its traf-
ﬁc, for example malicious Firefox extensions (e.g., FormSpy)
that function as spyware. In this case, the malware packet
has the same format as the application’s. In addition, the
malware trafﬁc and the legitimate application trafﬁc share the
same port and belong to the same process (and with the same
PID). In our test, the malware payload contains the unique
string kwhv for identiﬁcation, similar to the regular trafﬁc
sent by our simulator. Alternatively, malware may be stand-
alone application running on a unique port. Thus, the trafﬁc
monitor needs to intercept network activities at all open ports
to ensure the completeness.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the evaluation experiments that
aim to evaluate the efﬁciency of our solutions. We ran our
experiments on Windows XP Professional with SP3 installed
in a virtual machine with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 2.50GHz, 512
MB memory. The computer was connected to the department
wireless network through 802.11g protocol.
In our feasibility study (not shown), we manually inspected
trafﬁc from eMule peer-to-peer application. The results con-
ﬁrmed our hypothesis of the inter-packet dependencies and
the causal relation between user’s input activities and trafﬁc
payloads.
A. Performance of Real-Time Packet Inspection
We conducted series of experiments to evaluate network per-
formance of our solution under the simulation environments.
We ran the experiments on different scenarios to investigate the
overhead of our solution. We vary the sizes of packets and the
number of hash values, respectively, to evaluate their impact
on the efﬁciency of our solution. We ran each experiment
six times with the same hash values and packet sizes, and
computed average results. The 128-bit hash values used in
all of our experiments are randomly generated with MD5
algorithm.
We focus on evaluating the overhead of our hash-
comparison based deep-packet inspection on the network
throughput. We utilize a network performance measurement
tool Iperf to collect performance data. We vary the packet
payload from 2-Kbit to 60-Kbit consisting of random bytes.
We prepared lists of randomly-generated input hashes that
simulate hash values computed from user inputs. The numbers
of values on the input-hash lists are 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, and
300. Because the hash values in the input list and in packets
are random and have no correlation, the run time represents
the worst case scenarios – none of the hash values matches
between the input-hash list and payload. We also compare
the throughput with the original CompareView framework that
performs provenance veriﬁcation on packets, but without any
payload inspection.
Figure 6 shows our results with TCP packets. Throughputs
decrease as the number of hash values increase, which is
expected. This fact is because the comparison of long strings
takes longer time. Packet size has a small impact on the
throughput. Larger packets yield higher throughput as ex-
pected, because of better amortized overhead. Clearly, deep-
packet inspection slows down the network ﬂow signiﬁcantly
in our experiments. Our results are not optimized. Fast string-
comparison algorithms such as Boyer-Moore algorithm [1]
that have been used for virus scan and genome-sequence
comparison can be applied to improve the performance.
For run-time evaluation, we wrote a program that sends
UDP packets with random-generated hash values. For each
experiment, we sent 1,000 UDP packets for 6 times and
computed the average time needed to send all packets. Again,
the run time corresponds to the worst case scenarios with
all mismatches. We compare our performance with Compare-
View and vanilla TDIFW – the latter involves no security
mechanism. Our results are shown in Figure 7. TDIFW sends
packets much faster than other settings. The run time of deep-
packet inspection experiments is slightly slower than that of
CompareView, but comparable. Larger packets take longer to
transmit as expected. The increase of run time with the number
of hash values is not monotonic.
B. Performance of Off-line Packet Inspection
Real-time execution of our trafﬁc-sanitization analysis in-
curs overhead that may slow down outbound network ﬂow
from a host, as shown in Figures 6 and 7. The delay is mainly
from two sources: i) computation overhead due to comparison,
and ii) the synchronization delay between input-data stream
and packet stream. In order to isolate the computation over-
head associated with comparing hash values, we performed an
off-line packet-inspection analysis as follows.
We evaluated the efﬁciency of our solution when executed
ofﬂine, as opposed to real-time trafﬁc inspection. We stored
hash-value lists and UDP packets in the memory. The payload
of each packet contains a 128-bit MD5 hash and some header
bits. The list represents the input-hash list. We ran a Python
script to measure the run time for comparison. We deﬁne hit
rate as the percentage of packets that contain matching hash
values with the input-hash list. For example, 50% hit rate
means that half of the packets contain hash values that appear
in the input-hash list. The worst-case scenario corresponds to9
Fig. 5. A screenshot of the output from our kernel monitor. kwhv is the unique string that we use for identifying outgoing packets belonging to our simulator.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Packets
Best Case (100% Hit Rate) 
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 350 Hash Values
300 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Packets
80% Hit Rate
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 350 Hash Values
300 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Packets
50% Hit Rate
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 350 Hash Values
300 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Packets
20% Hit Rate
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 350 Hash Values
300 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
e
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Number of Packets
10% Hit Rate
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 300 Hash Values
350 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
T
i
m
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
e
s
)
Number of Packets
Worst Case (0 Hit Rate)
500 Hash Values 400 Hash Values 350 Hash Values
300 Hash Values 150 Hash Values 100 Hash Values
50 Hash Values
Fig. 8. The runtime of off-line payload-inspection analysis that compares UDP packets against lists of hash values.
Fig. 6. Comparing the network throughputs of CompareView alone and our
content sanitization with input-hash lists of various sizes. E.g., Hash250 indi-
cates that there are 250 hash values on the input-hash list. The CompareView
series of experiments do not involve any payload inspection.
0% hit rate, whereas in the best case the hit rate is 100%. The
runtime of comparison with different numbers of hash values
and UDP packets are evaluated. Figure 8 shows our results
with varying hit rates.
Summary Speciﬁcally, the hash-value comparison in our
Fig. 7. Worst-case (all mismatches) run time for sending 1,000 UDP packets
with random content and compare them against input-hash lists of various
sizes. Tdifw refers to the experiments with no security checking on outbound
packets. The CompareView series of experiments verify packet provenance,
but not payload inspection.
experiment is between an input-hash list of size n and m
number of outbound packets (i.e., outgoing-hash list of size
m). The comparison complexity is bounded by O(nm). The
complexity can be generalized as shown in Section III-B.10
The ofﬂine evaluation results show that the comparison-based
payload inspection can be efﬁciently executed once the data
is collected. Compared to the real-time trafﬁc inspection, the
ofﬂine analysis is much faster. It does not affect the network
throughput of the host, and incurs no delay due to data-stream
synchronization.
The disadvantage of ofﬂine evaluation is the storage over-
head. To mitigate the problem, periodic data shedding can be
scheduled to erase older entries. Another solution is to use our
tool for a short-term (e.g., for 24 hours) for diagnostics and
forensics purposes, a process conceptually similar to periodic
virus scanning on a host.
VI. RELATED WORK
User-intention based security has not been extensively stud-
ied in the computer-security literature as a general approach
to protect a host and detect malware activities. However,
there are several notable exceptions [8], [24]. Gummadi et
al. [8] proposed a bot-detection solution on a personal com-
puter that used hardware-assisted certiﬁcation mechanism to
distinguish human-generated trafﬁc from malware-generated
activities. Their solution requires a trusted proxy server to
certify keystroke events entered by the user. Shirley and
Evans [24] proposed to generate and enforce access-control
policies for ﬁle systems based on user intentions that are in-
ferred from the context of a transaction on a host. Cui et al [3]
proposed BINDER that is a framework for detecting extrusion
or exﬁltration by measuring the delay between timestamps
of user inputs and network packets. These solutions are for
anomaly detection that is similar to ours.
The main feature that distinguishes our work from the above
user-behavior inspired approaches is that our analysis is appli-
cation speciﬁc, which enables more ﬁne-grained and semantic-
aware inspection on the network trafﬁc. We uniquely leverage
the protocol-state machine for security and our sanitization
policies allow more sophisticated enforcement of the causal
relations between user actions and network events.
Data-loss prevention (DLP) is a term used by computer-
security industry to refer technologies that prevent sensitive
data from leaked out of a computer or network. Network-based
DLP solutions typically inspect outbound network packets for
sensitive data and compute the correlation coefﬁcients between
the two types of contents. For example, a recent solution
was proposed to compute the Pearson Correlation Coefﬁcient
(PCC) between artiﬁcially injected user inputs with outbound
trafﬁc to detect any keylogger on a host [18]. That approach
is robust to linear transformation of the exported data, and
will not be effective if strong encryption algorithm is used on
the stolen data. The PCC-based analysis is complementary to
our PSM-based policies and can be combined to provide more
scalable application-speciﬁc trafﬁc sanitization (See also our
future work in the next section).
Analyzing and characterizing peer-to-peer trafﬁc has been
traditionally studied for identiﬁcation peer-to-peer trafﬁc with
or without masqueraded techniques [2], [23]. For example,
Collins and Reiter [2] proposed to identifying peer-to-peer ﬁle
sharing trafﬁc by observed service behaviors. Sen, Spatscheck,
and Wang [23] applied application signatures on real-time
detection of peer-to-peer trafﬁc from large-scale trafﬁc. The
uniqueness of our approach is the human-behavior inspired
network analysis on a host and its concrete realization based
on the protocol-state machine.
Yen and Reiter [30] described an effective and elegant
network-level trafﬁc inspection solution for distinguishing
malicious P2P bots from legitimate P2P ﬁle-sharing clients.
Their analysis – based on properties such as volume, peer
churn, and interstitial time distribution can be deployed at
the router level. In comparison, we aim to construct a host-
based tool for protecting and diagnosing personal computers.
Our solution is able to utilize process, kernel, and payload
information to provide a ﬁne-grained control over the trafﬁc.
One speciﬁc difference between human-driven P2P trafﬁc and
machine-driven P2P trafﬁc that was studied by [30] is the
periodicity of activities – a higher self correlation indicates the
likelihood of programmed bot. In comparison, our anomaly-
detection approach does not target any speciﬁc malware-
behavior characteristics.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, our goal is to identify human-generated
outbound trafﬁc from what malware generates. We proposed
a novel storytelling-security approach that veriﬁes the de-
pendencies among critical system events associated with an
application. The analysis is based on the protocol-state ma-
chine, the data items associated with each state, and the
transitions among the states. We gave a concrete example of
using the storytelling-security methodology in sanitizing P2P
trafﬁc of a host. The policies are generated based on observing
the causal relations between user actions and network events
of a P2P application. This deep packet analysis allows the
detection of suspicious outbound trafﬁc that violates the causal
relations, and is useful for detecting P2P-based malware. We
implemented a prototype of our solution in Windows operating
system and performed extensive analysis to evaluate its online
and ofﬂine efﬁciency. Our experimental results showed that
the ofﬂine performance provides fast analysis without creating
any bottleneck on the network stack. Thus, our deep-packet
inspection tool is better used as an intrusion-detection system
as opposed to a real-time intrusion-protection system.
For future work, we plan to use statistical measures such
as Pearson correlation coefﬁcient to analysis the input-trafﬁc
correlation, which will allow us to perform the analysis in
a much larger scale. We will also investigate the tradeoff
between precision and efﬁciency. Another intriguing topic is
to generalize our approach to the analysis and enforcement
of composable protocol-state machines, which will allow us
to represent the user’s simultaneous interactions with multiple
applications.
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